

Early Journal Content on JSTOR, Free to Anyone in the World

This article is one of nearly 500,000 scholarly works digitized and made freely available to everyone in the world by JSTOR.

Known as the Early Journal Content, this set of works include research articles, news, letters, and other writings published in more than 200 of the oldest leading academic journals. The works date from the mid-seventeenth to the early twentieth centuries.

We encourage people to read and share the Early Journal Content openly and to tell others that this resource exists. People may post this content online or redistribute in any way for non-commercial purposes.

Read more about Early Journal Content at http://about.jstor.org/participate-jstor/individuals/early-journal-content.

JSTOR is a digital library of academic journals, books, and primary source objects. JSTOR helps people discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content through a powerful research and teaching platform, and preserves this content for future generations. JSTOR is part of ITHAKA, a not-for-profit organization that also includes Ithaka S+R and Portico. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.

sentence, his punishment for escape would be one year, while a convict serving a twenty-year sentence would be punished for exactly the same offense by being imprisoned just twenty times as long. The method of determining the punishment for one confined for life, attempting to escape, is not made clear. This statute was alleged to deny equal protection to all persons charged with its violation and to be unreasonable and class legislation. To say that the long-time convict is more culpable for precisely the same behavior, is absurd. The punishment for such escape would be not upon the act of escaping a prison, but upon the act of escaping a punishment fixed by the judgment of conviction. The statute, however, makes the escape from the state prison the offense, and not the escape from the punishment of the judgment fixed by the court upon trial. In Exparte Mallon, 102 Pacific Reporter, 374, the Idaho Supreme Court held this statute unconstitutional.

Prohibiting Seining in Vicinity of Docks.—The town of Santa Monica passed an ordinance prohibiting seining within 1,000 feet of its docks. In Ex parte Bailey, 101 Pacific Reporter, 441, the California Supreme Court thought it manifest from the terms of the ordinance that it was in no sense designed for the preservation and protection of fish for the benefit of the state. It was clearly the sole object of the ordinance to protect and add to the piscatorial advantages of the wharves, docks, and piers in the town, and to increase the fortune of the wielders of hook and line. This being the purpose of the ordinance, it was clearly beyond the power of the town to enact.

Soliciting Business by Attorney.—In Washington an attorney is prohibited from soliciting employment either directly or indirectly. A breach of these restrictions is termed barratry, for which the offender may be disbarred. Appellant in State v. Rossman, 101 Pacific Reporter, 357, had been charged with slander, perjury, fraud upon those employed to solicit business, and barratry. He contended that the right to practice law was a natural right guaranteed by the Constitution, and the barratry statute deprived him of his right to liberty and the pursuit of happiness in that he was forbidden to use his faculties as he chose in his vocation. The Washington Supreme Court thought the disbarment proper, remarking that the practice of law is not a constitutional right, but one granted by the state, which may surround it with reasonable restrictions.

Power of Courts to Punish for Contempt.—A Missouri statute prohibits courts from punishing contempts by fine exceeding \$50 or imprisonment for more than 10 days. In Chicago, B. & Q. Ry. Co. v. Gildersleeve, 118 Southwestern Reporter, 86, it appeared that appellant had disregarded an injunction forbidding his traffic in partly used